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Sweden has introduced schemes of participation widely in its industrial and business
organizations. We present in this article data concerning some of the social
psychological effects of two forms of participation, indirect and direct, in ten Swedish
factories. Indirect participation entails decision making through representatives
of the employees; direct participation entails decision making by the employees them-
selves. 
Theories propose that participation has the effect of enhancing member reactions such
as sense of commitment, favourable attitude and satisfaction in the company and of
reducing dysfunctional reactions such as absenteeism. The data from these companies
appear consistent with the above theories insofar as direct participation is concerned but
not with respect to indirect participation. The data support the view that participation is
likely to have the predicted effects on the reactions of members to the extent that
participation is felt as a personal experience. Members are likely to feel committed and
satisfied, first and foremost to the extent that they perceive themselves personally to
have authority to make decisions; second, and in lesser degree, to the extent that they
perceive their immediate work group to make decisions, and hardly at all to the extent
that they perceive that decisions are made by representatives. These findings are
consistent with conclusions drawn earlier by a number of researchers. They are
inconsistent with the expectation underlying the laws of participation in Sweden (and in
most other countries of Europe) insofar as these laws mandate indirect participation
exclusively and are formulated with the expectation that such participation will have the
positive psychological outcomes that many advocates of participation claim.
Introduction
Sweden has introduced schemes of participation widely in its industrial and
business organizations. All Swedish companies have at least one, and very
often several, participative bodies. These bodies are either required by law, are
a part of a nationwide agreement between union and employer associations
(which agreement in Sweden is almost as binding as law), or they are a result of
agreements, implicit or explicit, between a company and its employees. We
present in this article data concerning some of the social psychological effects of
some of these schemes in ten Swedish factories.
Arguments concerning the effects of participation have been published widely
and we therefore shall not repeat them here (see, for example, Katz and Kahn








1982; Rubenowitz 1974; Tannenbaum 1966; Walker 1974.) Our point of
departure is that participation may take on different forms and that the effects
of one form may differ from those of another. We shall be concerned with two
general forms, indirect and direct. In the former case, participation occurs
through representatives of the employees, while in the latter, the employees
themselves have some decision-making authority and/or they personally take
part in participative deliberations. Participative bodies in the case of indirect
participation usually include representatives from different parts of the
company and these bodies are therefore concerned with companywide policies
regarding topics relevant to the welfare of employees, like the production plan,
working conditions in the plant, or personnel policy. Direct participation, on
the other hand, usually involves members through their work group or through
their relationship with their supervisor. Such participation, therefore, usually
concentrates on issues of immediate concern to employees at their work-
place.
Our analyses have been designed to explore two general questions:
1. Do members in companies that have a substantial formal system of indirect
participation differ from members in companies with a less substantial system
with respect to (a) their perception of decision making (i.e., participation) in
their company, and (b) psychological outcomes such as their commitment,
favourable attitude and satisfaction regarding the company, that theories in the
literature propose are associated with participation?
2. Do members in companies with a direct form of participation (in addition to
some degree of indirect participation which is common in all Swedish
companies) differ in the above ways from members in companies that do not
have a direct form of participation?
Answers to these questions, we believe, may have practical as well as
theoretical significance. The participative procedures required by law in
Sweden (and in most other countries where participation is required) are
exclusively representative and, therefore, indirect. Models based on social
science theories and research, on the other hand, prescribe primarily direct
forms of participation. The latter models imply that direct involvement by
members is necessary if the positive effects of participation on members’
motivation and satisfaction are to be realized.
Indirect and Direct Forms of Participation in Sweden
Several participative bodies illustrate forms of indirect participation that are
common in Sweden. One is a union-management steering committee that is an
outcome of the 1977 Swedish Act of Codetermination. This act requires that
the management of a company inform its union(s) of its intention to make any
change that might be important to the employees. Accordingly, a union-
management steering committee has been established in many companies as
the means through which the company keeps its employees informed about its
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intentions. Should the company make a change without informing the union,
the latter has recourse to the National Labor Court that will levy a substantial
fine against the company if it finds the company remiss in its obligation to
inform its employees. The joint committee is more than a unilateral means of
communication, however, since the union will indicate its support or
opposition to changes proposed by the company and a detailed discussion
> between the two parties is likely to take place. The union has access in these
discussions to all relevant information about the company, financial as well as
technological. While the union representatives do not have formal decision-
making authority, the union may bring the matter to a central arbitration organ
that includes representatives of labour and management, if the company
chooses to go ahead against the opposition of the union. Discussion within the
committee may therefore resemble a negotiation through which representa-
tives of the employees may exercise substantial influence over company
actions.
The board of directors of a company illustrates another common participative
body in many companies since unions have the legal right to seats on the board
. of any company of at least 25 employees. Although the employee
representatives (who are appointed by the unions) constitute only a minority of
the board’s membership, they may nonetheless participate fully in the
deliberations of the board, and they have voting rights along with the other
members.
A safety committee is a third participative body that exists in many industrial
organizations. All companies of at least 50 persons are required by Swedish law
to have such a committee composed of a majority of persons appointed by the
union(s) in a company and a minority appointed by the company management.
Companies of under 50 persons are also required to have a safety committee if
. the union(s) request it. The safety committee often has its own budget and it
has formal authority to enforce its decisions, which are concerned with
conditions in the company that may affect the safety of employees.
. A works council illustrates a further participative body in many companies.
Prior to the 1977 Act, a national agreement between the unions and employers
required that all companies of 50 persons or more have such a council
composed of management persons and representatives of the employees
appointed by the union(s) within the company. Works councils are no longer
mandated by a national agreement but many companies have nonetheless
retained them because of their apparent utility. Works councils provide a
forum for sharing information and discussing issues of mutual concern. Such
councils have no formal decision-making authority, but they provide a means
through which employee representatives might influence management and vice
versa.
Many companies are also likely to have an adjustment committee, which is
recommended (if not required) by law in all companies. The adjustment
committee is concerned with solving problems in the company that might be
associated with the employment of handicapped persons, problem drinkers, or
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persons hurt through accidents. The committee might include an ’expert’, such
as a doctor or nurse, as well as union and management representatives.
Decisions of this committee are advisory to the executive committee of the
company.
These groups illustrate participative bodies that have some basis, past or
present, in Swedish law or in a central agreement between the parties of the
labour market and they all illustrate indirect forms of participation,
representatives of the employees including blue and white collar workers, not
the employees themselves, take part in the discussions of these participative
bodies. Formal systems of direct participation, in which each employee
personally has a role in the decision-making process, also exist in Sweden,
although such systems are not as widespread as are the indirect forms. We shall
describe one such scheme found in several of the companies studied and
therefore relevant to the analyses we shall present.
A number of plants in Sweden have agreements with their unions which
establish decision-making groups composed of all members of each work
group, along with their supervisor. These decision-making groups are highly
formalized in that they are part of an explicit agreement and they have specified
rules. A number of principles serve as guidelines for these schemes:
,: 1. Decision making should occur at the lowest possible level in the company.
Thus, decisions that affect an individual or a work group alone should be made
by that individual or by members of that group. Every effort should be made to
achieve a consensus within the group although the supervisor of the group in
most cases retains final authority should he or she disagree with others in the
group. Decisions that affect several groups might be initiated within one group,
but the decision should be made by a group composed of the supervisors of the
affected groups along with the superiors of these supervisors. Similarly,
plantwide decisions might in principle be proposed at relatively low levels in
the organization, but such proposals should be transmitted to the union-
management steering committee or some equivalent organ composed of
representatives of the union(s) and of management. Thus, while the formal
decision-making structure resembles the system of ’overlapping families’ and
’linking pins’ proposed by Likert (1961) that are designed to enhance the
.’~ authority of rank and file employees, it differs from Likert’s system in that
these employees may have substantial impact through one of the labour-
management representational bodies. While the scope of decision-making
authority of each group is limited to matters that affect the group alone, all of
the groups together comprise a system that can determine decisions that apply
to the company as a whole.
2. Each group should have a budget of its own, which is designed to foster self
determination of the group. The budget provides opportunities for, as well as
limits to, self determination. These decision-making groups may adopt the
model of the so-called ’autonomous group’ according to which the group’s
technological, economic, and personnel ’inputs’, ’throughputs’, and ’outputs’
are regulated by members of the group within the limits of its budget and the
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requirements of the larger organization of which it is a part. Decisions
regarding personnel within the group are an important component of the
group’s prerogatives. The group should be empowered to make decisions or
have a substantial say (e.g., by veto right) about work methods, aspects of
technology, promotions, transfers, admission of new members, vacation
schedules, and leaves.
3. These direct participation groups should be integrated as much as possible
with the companywide system of indirect participation. The two systems should
work in harmony, each contributing to the effectiveness of the other. For
example, any of the indirect participation groups described above may receive
proposals from a group engaged in direct participation - or vice versa.
This model of direct participation, which has been adopted in a number of
companies in Sweden, bears a striking resemblance, in some of its aspects at
least, to models proposed by social scientists. The notions of system theory,
organic organization, autonomous groups, sociotechnical systems, organiza-
tional families, and linking pins that help to define the model of direct
participation are part of the thinking of many Swedish managers, even though
the terminology they employ may not always correspond to that of the social
scientist. Sweden is a small country and many managers and social scientists in
. the field of organizational behaviour know one another and communicate often
with one another. Managers acquire some of their concepts and some
. encouragement about participation through business schools, training pro-
grammes, and meetings of business associations, such as the Swedish
Employers’ Association. Equally important in explaining the broad adoption
of participation in Swedish business and industrial organizations is Swedish
culture itself, which attaches importance to a strong work ethic, along with the





As mentioned above, all companies in Sweden with more than 50 employees
have some form of representative participation, but in some companies the
representative bodies are not very active or influential. Other companies,
however, have active and influential participative bodies that illustrate a high
level of actual or real representative participation. We selected ten companies
. on the assumption that some would be high and some would be low on actual or
real participation. A measure of such participation was then obtained in each
company through interviews with the president, production manager,
personnel manager, all top union officials, and with a key informant in four of
the following five participative bodies: works council, joint consultation group,
adjustment group, board of directors, and safety committee. The agreement
between informants was strikingly high, with interrater reliabilities being on
. average 0.80.
The items of information collected for each representative body in a company,
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which items were the basis for rating the company’s actual (indirect)
participativeness, concerned the level of activity of the representative body, its
formal decision-making power and the nature of the decisions it makes. These
items are described in more detail in the Appendix. The measure places the ten
plants on a continuum of participativeness but we divided the companies into
two sets for purposes of analysis, a relatively participative and nonparticipative
set, depending on whether a company falls above or below the median score of
all companies.
The measure of direct participation in a company, on the other hand, is a
dichotomous one - the company either has a direct system or it does not -
and is based on (a) the existence of a formal agreement between the company
and the union, consistent with the above principles, and (b) explicit evidence of
.. direct, participative decision-making groups in the company. Three of the ten
companies in this research have such a direct system of participation.
In addition to the above measures of direct and indirect participation based on
. information obtained from key informants, data were gathered through a
. 
paper and pencil questionnaire administered to all employees including
managers within production, maintenance, and control in each company. The
questionnaire was administered within the plant during working hours and the
response rate varied from 85 per cent to 90 per cent among the ten companies.
Several items in this questionnaire were designed to measure employees’
perceptions of (a) their personal decision-making authority, (b) the extent to
. which decisions are made through the work groups to which they belong, and
(c) the extent to which decisions are made through representative bodies. We
refer to these measures (which are presented in the Appendix) as applying to
the perception of decision making at the individual, group, and representative
. levels respectively and we take the measures to imply information about
employees’ perceptions of the directness of their involvement in decision
making. Decision making at the individual level is the most direct; decision
making at the representative level is the least direct.
The dependent variables - the predicted psychological effects of participation
- were, with one exception, also measured through the questionnaire
administered to all employees. These variables, the measures of which are
presented in the Appendix, include commitment, favourable attitude, and
satisfaction regarding the company. In addition, objective data concerning
absenteeism were available as departmental averages from the records of 25
departments in five of the companies. Because these data are limited to five
r I companies they do not lend themselves to comparisons between the more and
less participative (direct or indirect) companies. Analyses of these data can
nonetheless provide information about the relationship between absenteeism
=. and employees’ perceptions of participation at three levels - individual,
group, and representative.
The plants in the study vary in size from 55 to 1,100 members with an average of
362. There are no systematic differences between the participative and less
participative organizations (direct or indirect) in their average size, sex
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composition, skill level of employees, or rural-urban location. Table 1 presents
information concerning the level of participativeness (direct and indirect) of
each company along with its type of product, ownership, number of
employees, and number of respondents.
Results 
z
Our analysis is designed to determine whether persons in companies that are
relatively participative perceive their companies to be more participative than
do persons in less participative companies and whether the former persons are
more satisfied in and more favourably disposed toward their companies than
are the latter persons. The answer to these questions, insofar as indirect
participation is concerned, appears to be negative. We are able to detect no
significant differences between members in the relatively participative and
non-participative companies in their perception of participation or in their
satisfaction or motivation. Differences do appear, however, when companies
with direct participation are compared to companies without direct participa-
tion. _
Table 2 presents the above comparisons. Rows 1-3 show the average responses
on a five-point scale to three questions concerning decision making at the
individual, group, and representative levels regarding a number of topics in the
company such as the allocation of tasks, the making and evaluating of budgets,
accident prevention, and the promotion and transfer of employees (see
Appendix).
The measures shown in Table 2 are concerned with direct as well as with
indirect, representative participation. All companies in Sweden include some
scheme of indirect participation, although in some cases the scheme may be
more nominal than real. The data of Table 2, in fact, suggest that in the view of
employees, decisions are actually made or influence is exercised more
substantially by members as well as by their representatives in the companies
with a scheme of direct participation than in companies without such a scheme.
Thus companies that differ according to our criteria of indirect participation do
not appear to differ in the way members perceive either direct or indirect
participation. On the other hand, companies that differ according to our
criteria of direct participation differ in the way members perceive both direct
and indirect participation, although the differences are small. (Two of the three
companies with schemes of direct participation were initially rated by company
informants to have relatively participative representative bodies.) One of the
principles of the direct, ’organic’ model of participation in these Swedish plants
is that such participation should be complementary to and thus should
strengthen the company-wide system of indirect participation. The data of
Table 2 suggest that the direct system of participation in these plants may be












The remaining rows of the table present data concerning variables that are
presumed by theories of participation to be affected by participation: general
commitment, company spirit, satisfaction with company policy, and general
job satisfaction. Each of these variables is measured by an index, the
components of which were determined by a factor analysis on responses to
questionnaire items. In general, the items included in an index have factor
loadings of more than 0.40. We present in the Appendix the two items with the
highest loadings for each index, to illustrate the content of the index. Each
questionnaire item was answered in terms of a five-point scale.
Companies with formal systems of direct participation are significantly higher
on each of the dependent variables than companies without such systems of
participation, although the differences between the two sets of companies are
not large. In the case of companies that differ in indirect participation,
however, with one minor exception, no difference could be detected on these
dependent variables.
Our analysis attempts to distinguish between direct and indirect participation,
although it does not deal with pure cases of either one. The five companies that
are defined as high in indirect participation include two companies that are also
high in direct participation (and three that are low), while the five companies
that are defined as low in indirect participation include one company that is
high in direct participation (and four that are low). As Table 2 indicates, we do
not find differences in the dependent variables between the companies that are
high and those that are low in indirect participation. It seems very unlikely that
this failure to find differences is attributable to the fact that two of the
companies that are high on indirect participation are also high on direct
participation. On the other hand, we do find differences in the dependent
variables when we distinguish the plants on the basis of direct participation. In
this case two of the three companies that are high on direct participation are
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also high on indirect. But we have seen that indirect participation is an unlikely
explanation of differences in the dependent variables. Hence we see some
evidence in this table that it is direct participation, not indirect, that explains
the differences in the dependent variables.
Tables 3 and 4 present data that provide a further basis for evaluating the
relative effects of direct and indirect participation. Participation as an
independent variable in Table 2 is measured ’objectively’, independent of the
respondents. The data of Tables 3 and 4 are based on subjective measures.
Table 3 shows product moment correlations between the predicted outcomes
of participation for members (shown in Table 2) and members’ perceptions of
participation in decision making at the three levels (that are also shown in
Table 2). The highest correlations for all outcomes occur with respect to the
respondents’ perception that they personally have authority to make decisions;
the lowest correlations occur with respect to the perception that decisions are
made by representatives. Furthermore, although the correlation is not shown
in the table, members’ perceptions of their own authority correlates only 0.18
with members’ perception of participation through representatives. These
responses apparently are not subject to much of a halo effect or response set;
on the contrary, members appear to discriminate well between these distinct
forms of participation and the results suggest that it is perception of personal
authority in decision making more than perception of participation through
representatives that is associated with the predicted psychological outcomes of
participation. Thus the results shown in Table 3 are consistent with and help to








The implications of Table 4 are very much like those of Table 3, although the
dependent variable in this case, absenteeism, is based on company records
rather than on responses by employees to a questionnaire. Records of short-
term absenteeism were available as averages in each of 25 departments of five
companies. These data therefore provide a ’hard’ criterion against which to test
the effects of perceived participation at the three levels. Correlations are based
on average scores of participation and absenteeism respectively in the
departments but only the first of these correlations is significant statistically.
Departments in which employees perceive themselves to have relatively great
authority in decision making are likely to be relatively low in absenteeism.
There is no indication, however, that departments in which employees
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perceive a relatively high level of participation through representatives are








Summary and Conclusions . , -~r’.
Participation is a widely discussed concept in contemporary societies, not least
of all in Sweden. Advocates of participation argue that participative decision
making is ’democratic’ and/or that participation has positive effects on the
motivation of members and on the quality of their work life. The data of this
research, while limited to ten companies, has implications for these argu-
ments.
Our point of departure is that participation takes on different forms and that
the above claims for participation may apply to some forms but not to others.
One important variation is that between direct and indirect participation. All
companies in Sweden of 50 persons or more have an indirect, representative
system of participation, although the participative decision-making bodies in
some of these companies may not in fact be active or influential. We have
assumed that companies judged by a group of key informants to have active
and influential bodies illustrate real representative participation, while
companies that are judged to have inactive bodies illustrate only a nominal
form of participation. We found no difference between these two sets of
companies, however, in members’ feeling of commitment, attitude toward the
company, or satisfaction with their job. Nor did we find significant differences
between these two sets of companies in the perception by employees of
participation at either the individual, group, or representative levels. Thus
while the key informants in these companies agree closely with one another
about the level of activity and power of the representative bodies, the
employees as a whole do not give any indication that the two sets of companies
differ from one another in degree of participativeness.
On the other hand, a comparison of the responses of members in three
companies that have a formal system of direct participation (in addition to the
mandatory, representative system) with the responses of members in
companies that have an indirect system only yields differences consistent with
hypotheses about the positive implications of participation. Members in the
former companies more than in the latter report a higher level of participation
at the individual, group, and representative levels and they are relatively
committed to their company and satisfied with their job.
It is possible that the lack of difference in these outcomes in the case of indirect
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participation is attributable to error in our classification of the companies based
on the judgements of key informants. The informants agree closely with one
another about the level of activity and power of the representative bodies in
their company, but their judgement might simply reflect shared stereotypes.
The degree of (indirect) participation therefore might not in fact be different in
the two sets of companies. Yet the analyses that show larger correlations with
the psychological outcomes (including absenteeism objectively measured)
when the predictor is the employees’ perception of personal authority than
when the predictor is their perception of the decision-making power of
representative bodies add credence to the argument that direct participation
has the predicted effects that indirect participation does not have and that
participation is likely to have these effects to the extent that participation is felt
as a personal experience. Members are likely to feel committed and satisfied,
first and foremost to the extent that they perceive themselves personally to
have authority to make decisions; second, and in lesser degree, to the extent
that they perceive their immediate work group to make decisions, and hardly at
all to the extent that they perceive that decisions are made by representative
bodies in their company. Thus, the closer the participation is perceived to be to
the respondent himself or herself the more likely participation is associated
with the effects that are predicted for it.
Studies of participation do not invariably demonstrate positive effects of
participation on the satisfaction or other morale-related attitudes of workers.
Research by the IDE International Research Group, for example, finds that
while workers believe that both direct and indirect participation have ’quite
positive’ effects (1981b:266), workers’ satisfaction is unaffected by the
influence of the works council or by the (direct) influence of the workers
themselves (1981c). Nonetheless, most of the relevant research supports the
hypothesis that participation is associated with workers’ satisfaction or other
indices of workers’ morale, if not with their level of performance (Locke and
Schweiger 1979). The data of the present study in Sweden are consistent with
this hypothesis for direct, but not for indirect participation. They are also in
accord with the conclusions concerning direct and indirect participation drawn
by Holter ( 1965), Emery and Thorsrud (1969) and Thorsrud et al. (1976) in
Norway but not with the findings of Bartolke et al. (1982) in Germany.
Bart6lke et al. do find an effect of indirect participation on the perceived
influence of workers. These researchers conclude that Germany may differ
from other countries in the responsiveness of persons to indirect participation.
’Indirect participation implies a more centralized system of participation than does
direct participation, and it is possible that members of German organizations are more
responsive to such participation than are organization members in some other
countries. Support for this interpretation is provided by studies that demonstrate the
comparatively centralized problem-definition and problem-solving processes in
Germany (Child and Kieser 1979; Hofstede 1979; Lammers and Hickson 1979), thus
indicating that Germans, more than some other nationalities, are accustomed to and
, perhaps more receptive to centralization.’
255
Systems of representative participation need not imply decision making or
influence by the workers themselves. Nonetheless, it is indirect, representative
participation primarily, not direct participation, that has been and continues to
be mandated by law in Sweden as in other countries of Europe. Such
participation may satisfy a stereotyped conception about participation, but we
see no evidence in the companies of this study that it is likely to have the effect
of giving members a feeling of control, or that it is likely to have positive effects
on the motivation and adjustment of members. If legislators in countries like
Sweden intend to achieve such effects, they may have to consider laws that
encourage direct participation as well as indirect, although the formulation of
such laws may not be easy. Systems of representative participation illustrate a
political type model with which lawmakers are familiar. Direct participation,
on the other hand, implies a social psychological type model that is unfamiliar
to legislators and that may not in any case be as amenable to legal formulations
as is representative participation.4 Furthermore, trade unions at the national
level in Sweden have supported indirect forms of participation, while they have
shown limited enthusiasm for efforts by management or by social scientists to
introduce direct forms. Lawmakers committed to legislation designed to
encourage participation and to achieve the positive effects that participation is
presumed to achieve in the work organization may nonetheless have to
consider models of direct participation. Perhaps social scientists and others
who have had experience with such participation in work organizations might
have a role to play in helping to formulate such legislation, and in gaining the
support of unions for schemes of direct participation.
Notes 1. Data used in this article are from the international study. ’Members’ Participation in Industrial
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Tannenbaum (USA) and D. Nightingale (Canada) shared in an earlier phase of the study. The
present authors are responsible for the content of this article.
2. The third author would like to thank the German Marshall Fund of the United States for
providing support through a fellowship that enabled him to participate in this project.
3. For a detailed description of industrial relations in Sweden see IDE Research Group (1981a).
4. For an illustration of legislation that is concerned with direct participation as well as indirect
see Secretariat of Information SFR of Yugoslav Assembly (1977).
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Appendix: Measures
I. Indirect participativeness - information from key informants
A. Level of activity of each representative body
1. Number of meetings , ,
, 
2. The agenda 
°
Does an agenda exist?
How available is it?
Can workers and others place items on it? ..
Do all employees receive minutes?
B. Decision power 
’ 
’
Is the body empowered to make decisions or only to consult?
C. Nature of the decisions 
’ &dquo; 
’ ’
1. How important are the decisions that are made?
2. How many persons are affected by the decisions?
The items under ’Level of activity’ were scored on two or three point scales.
For example, four or fewer meetings were scored one; five to ten meetings were
scored two; and more than ten meetings were scored three. The absence of an
agenda was scored one; the existence of an agenda was scored two. For the
item under ’Decision power’, each representative body was rated on a
five-point scale from one, ’Only formal consultation; decision is made by others
irrespective of the opinion of the body’. through three, ’The body can in fact
have a substantial impact on the decision, although the formal decision is made
by others’, to five, ’The body has full decision-making power’. For the items
under ’Nature of the decisions’, each representative body was rated on
five-point scales from one, ’Only decisions about questions of detail that cost
very little and/or affect few employees’, to five, ’Decisions that have important
consequences that are expensive and that affect many persons’. Scores on the
scales for each item in each company were summed to obtain a score for the
company. Thus, companies with active and influential bodies that make
decisions about important issues are considered according to this measure to be
relatively high in actual representative participation compared to companies
with bodies that are inactive, uninfluential and/or that make decisions
concerning unimportant matters at best.
II. Participative decision making - questionnaire measures
A. Individual level:
To what extent do you usually have authority to make decisions on your own
regarding the following topics? - , . ,.
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B. Group level:
To what extent are decisions usually made by the whole group of which you are
a member regarding the following topics? [The topics and response format for
this question are identical to those of the previous question.]
C. Representative level:
To what extent are decisions usually made by groups, councils or committees
composed of management, and elected, salaried and blue collar representa-
tives regarding the following topics? [The topics and response format for this
question are identical to those of the previous question.]
III. Predicted member reactions (question with the two highest factor loadings
for each index)
A. General commitment
To what extent do you really feel involved in the results of your own work?
To what extent do you really feel involved in the results of your department?
B. Company spirit
Do you like working for this company?
How openly do employees in the company communicate to their superiors?
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C. Satisfaction with company policy
How do you feel about the way your company treats its employees in
comparison to what you know about other companies’ ways of treating their
employees?
What do you think of your work in terms of pay and other fringe benefits
offered by the company?
D. General job satisfaction
Do you like the work you are doing in this plant?
How much opportunity is there for you to use your skills and abilities?
Each of the above questions was answered in terms of a five-point scale such as
the following:
1. not at all
2. a little
3. somewhat
4. quite a bit
5. very much
